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THE TREACHERY OF PERCEPTION:
EVIDENCE AND EXPERIENCE IN CLARISSA
Judy M. Cornett*
Let us then suppose the Mind to be, as we say, white Paper, void of
all Characters, without any Ideas; How comes it to be furnished?...
Whence has it all the materials of Reason and Knowledge? To this I
answer,' in one word, From Experience: In that, all our Knowledge is
founded ....
John Locke, An Essay Concerning Human Understanding'
She has a world of knowledge; knowledge speculative, as I may say;
but no experience!
Robert Lovelace to John Belford, Clarissa'
I.

INTRODUCTION

Just as Western epistemology "treats persons in some sense as
knowers,"' so the Anglo-American law of evidence treats jurors as
* Associate Professor of Law, University of Tennessee. B.A., J.D., University of Tennessee; M.A., Ph.D. candidate, University of Virginia. In earlier versions, this Article was
presented at conferences of the American Society for Eighteenth-Century Studies and the American Society for Legal History. I am grateful to the participants in those conferences for their
help and encouragement and to others who read and commented on various drafts: Joseph G.
Cook, Elizabeth V. Gemmette, Michael H. Hoffheimer, Benjamin Moore, Jerry J. Phillips,
Aviam Soifer, and Kathryn Temple. I am especially grateful to my dissertation adviser, Patricia
Meyer Spacks, and to Thomas D. Eisele, who invited me to participate in this Symposium.
Support for conference travel was provided by the Research Incentive Fund of the University of
Tennessee.
1. JOHN LOCKE. AN ESSAY CONCERNING HUMAN UNDERSTANDING 104 (Peter H. Nidditch ed., Clarendon Press 1975) (4th ed. 1700).
2. SAMUEL RICHARDSON, CLARISSA OR THE HISTORY OF A YOUNG LADY 789 (Angus
Ross ed., Viking Penguin 1985) (1747-48). My reliance upon the Penguin edition of Clarissa,
which is based upon the first edition of the novel, contravenes convention. Critics generally cite
the Shakespeare Head Press edition, which is based upon the novel's third edition, published in
1759. See Florian Stuber, On Original and Final Intentions, or Can There Be an Authoritative
Clarissa?, 2 TEXT: TRANSACTIONS OF THE SOCIETY FOR TEXTUAL SCHOLARSHIP 229, 229
(1985). But see TOM KEYMER, RICHARDSON'S CLARISSA AND THE EIGHTEENTH-CENTURY

READER at xxii (1992) (explaining reasons for relying on the first edition). I have chosen to cite
the Penguin edition in this Article, not because the first edition represents Richardson's "original" intentions, but because the first edition represents the text prior to Richardson's insertion,
in the second and third editions, of more elaborate editorial devices and because the Penguin
edition is readily available to general readers. See id. at 229-30. See generally T.C. Duncan
Eaves & Ben D. Kimpel, The Composition of Clarissa and Its Revision Before Publication, 83
PROC. MOD. LANGUAGE Ass'N 416 (1968) (Richardson circulated the manuscript of the novel
in at least three versions).
3. JAY WILLIAM HUDSON, THE TREATMENT OF PERSONALITY BY LOCKE, BERKELEY
AND HUME 12 (1911).
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knowers, who must gain their "knowledge of the events or situations
about which they have to decide" solely from the evidence, "information from which further information is derived or inferred." 4 And just
as, for Locke, the ultimate aim of knowledge is Truth,' so the law of
evidence is grounded upon "the culture's general understanding of how
we 'know' things to be true."' The link between epistemology and the
law of evidence was forged explicitly by Sir Geoffrey Gilbert in the
"first real treatise on evidence, ' 7 The Law of Evidence,' published in
Dublin in 1754.' Onto the body of early eighteenth-century English
evidence law, which comprised a motley collection of rulings *aboutthe
quantum and type of evidence required in individual cases, 1" Gilbert
grafted a Lockean framework, organizing his treatise in terms of the
"Degrees of Assent" set out in Book IV of Locke's Essay on Human

4. William Twining, Evidence and Legal Theory, in LEGAL THEORY AND COMMON
LAW 62, 66 (William Twining ed., 1986).
5. Locke explains his goal in the Essay by noting the skeptical propositions "[t]hat either
there is no such thing as Truth at all; or that Mankind hath no sufficient Means to attain a
certain Knowledge of it." LOCKE, supra note 1, at 44; see also id. at 527 ("There are several
ways wherein the Mind is possessed of Truth; each of which is called Knowledge."). The Essay
is itself a truth-seeking enterprise. See, e.g., id. at 65 ("I impartially search after Truth ......
id. at 100 ("Truth has been my only aim ....").
6. BARBARA J. SHAPIRO, "BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT" AND "PROBABLE CAUSE":
HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVES ON THE ANGLO-AMERICAN LAW OF EVIDENCE 2 (1991).

7. Id. at 26. An earlier work on evidence, attributed to William Nelson, was published in
London in 1717. [WILLIAM NELSON?], THE LAW OF EVIDENCE (London, Elizabeth Nutt & R.
Gosling 1717). Presumably, this work has not been considered a "real" treatise because it was
essentially a "Collection out of almost a hundred Books" of precedents relating to evidence. Id.
See generally WILLIAM TWINING, RETHINKING EVIDENCE: EXPLORATORY ESSAYS 35 (1990)
(describing Nelson's work as a "digest").
8. SIR GEOFFREY GILBERT, THE LAW OF EVIDENCE (Garland Publishing, Inc. 1979)
(1754).
9. The treatise was published posthumously; it was written prior to Gilbert's death in
1726. See TWINING, supra note 7, at 35. Blackstone still cited Gilbert's treatise as authoritative
in the 1760s, see 3 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE. COMMENTARIES *367, and "[n]ineteenth century
evidence scholars appear to have viewed Gilbert's work as the starting point for analysis," Ste-

phan Landsman, The Rise of the Contentious Spirit: Adversary Procedure in Eighteenth Century England, 75 CORNELL L. REV. 497, 592 n.481 (1990). However, Landsman asserts, "[I]t
is generally agreed that Gilbert's work reflects an understanding of evidence formed no later
than the opening decade of the eighteenth century." Id. at 592.
10. See, e.g., GILBERT, supra note 8, at 165.
In Trespass for taking down a Pew, the Evidence was, that the Pew was fastened
to the Pillar of the Church with a Chain; this is no good Evidence to prove the
Declaration; otherwise it is if it had been fixed to the Pillar by a Nail; for in the
one Case 'tis not fixed to the Freehold, but in the other it is....
Id. Thus, in Ronald J. Allen's terms, Gilbert's treatise addressed both "the structure of
proof"-"what must be proven"-and a "theory of evidence"-"how this is done, what counts
as evidence and .. .how it is processed." Ronald J. Allen, Factual Ambiguity and a Theory of
Evidence, 87 Nw. U. L. REV. 604, 606 (1994).
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1
Understanding.
In recent years, scholars have shown renewed interest in "the topic
of evidence, inference, probability and uncertainty."" Exemplary of
this renewed interest is Barbara J. Shapiro's interdisciplinary study,
"Beyond Reasonable Doubt" and "Probable Cause": Historical Perspectives on the Anglo-American Law of Evidence,"3 in which she examines "the way in which religious and philosophical notions concerning the nature of truth and the appropriate methods of attaining it
affect legal concepts of evidence and proof."1 Literary scholars have
also become interested in exploring evidentiary issues.1 5 In Strong

11. GILBERT, supra note 8, at 1-5. See generally SHAPIRO, supra note 6, at 26-27. Gilbert's scheme also engrafted the qualitative approach of the Romano-canon law system of proof.
See Landsman, supra note 9, at 594; infra note 67. See generally SHAPIRO, supra note 6, at
115-27. Thus, Twining classifies Gilbert as an advocate of the "best evidence" principle, see
TWINING, supra note 7, at 188; infra note 57, and sees his approach as a dead end in the
evolution of the modern approach to evidence, which Twining traces to Thayer, see TWINING,
supra note 7, at 188-89, 196. However, Twining does include Gilbert in the "rationalist tradition." Id. at 71-72.
12. Peter Tillers, Introduction, 66 B.U. L. REV. 381, 382 (1986). In 1986, William Twining complained that traditional evidence scholarship, which he termed the "Rationalist Tradition," see William Twining, The Rationalist Tradition of Evidence Scholarship, in WELL AND
TRULY TRIED: ESSAYS ON EVIDENCE IN HONOUR OF SIR RICHARD EGGLESTON 211 (Enid

Campbell & Louis Waller eds., 1982), was "homogenous, isolated, normative and optimistically
rationalistic," Twining, supra note 4, at 71. He called for more "diverse and interdisciplinary"
evidence scholarship that would "explore the implications of adopting more skeptical postures or
a different conception of rationality" and would draw upon "other relevant but diverse fields."
Id. at 70-71. Twining's call is being answered. Since 1986, at least three law review symposia
have been devoted to evidence. Symposium, Decision and Inference in Litigation, 13 CARDOZO
L. REV. 253 (1991); Symposium, Does Evidence Law Matter?, 25 Loy. LA. L. REV. 629
(1992); Symposium, Probability and Inference in the Law of Evidence, 66 B.U. L. REV. 377
(1986). This renewed interest has generated what Richard Lempert calls "[tlhe New Evidence
Scholarship." Richard Lempert, The New Evidence Scholarship: Analyzing the Process of
Proof, 66 B.U L. REV. 439 (1986); see Peter Tillers, Intellectual History, Probability, and the
Law of Evidence, 91 MICH. L. REV. 1465, 1466 n.16 (1993) [hereinafter Tillers, Intellectual
History] (noting that Lempert "invented" this phrase) (reviewing SHAPIRO, supra note 6).
Much of this new scholarship "relates theories of probability to theories of proof" and involves
"largely a debate between those who advocate some role for Bayesian modes of inference ...
and those who criticize or reject this position." Lempert, supra, at 440. In Lempert's words,
"Evidence is being transformed from a field concerned with the articulation of rules to a field
concerned with the process of proof." Id. at 439.
13. SHAPIRO, supra note 6.
14. Id. at xiii.
15. Legal scholars are interested in the relationship of evidence and narrative. See, e.g.,
BERNARD S. JACKSON, LAW, FACT AND NARRATIVE COHERENCE (1988); TWINING, supra
note 7, at 219-61 (chapter entitled "Lawyers' Stories"); see also Richard Lempert, Telling Tales in Court: Trial Procedure and the Story Model, 13 CARDOZO L. REV. 559 (1991); Nancy
Pennington & Reid Hastie, A Cognitive Theory of Juror Decision Making: The Story Model,
13 CARDOZO L. REV. 519, 520 (1991) ("[A] central cognitive process in juror decision making is
story construction."). See generally Jane B. Baron, Resistance to Stories, 67 S. CAL. L. REV.
255 (1994). In her article, Baron examines "[clurrent interest in legal storytelling," id. at 255,
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Representations: Narrative and CircumstantialEvidence in England,"

literary critic Alexander Welsh examines legal sources for the eighteenth-century view that "[c]ircumstances cannot lie." ' He concludes
that, from the mid-eighteenth century, "narratives built on carefully
managed circumstantial evidence," 8 employing a third-person narrator
who undertakes the task of "presenting and summarizing and evaluating the evidence," 9 became the dominant novelistic form.
In this Article, I hope to continue the interdisciplinary work exemplified by Shapiro and Welsh by using Gilbert's treatise, with its
Lockean framework, to examine the evidentiary issues raised in Sa2" Faced with a series of
muel Richardson's epistolary novel, Clarissa.
epistemological crises, the novel's heroine, Clarissa Harlowe, must
evaluate the evidence of others' true natures and their intentions toward her. To an extent largely unacknowledged by previous critics,2"
Clarissa is presented as a "knower," and I will focus upon the aspects
of the novel that move to the foreground when she is considered in that
light.2 2 Clarissa's story exposes the fundamental assumptions underly-

and "the sudden, and rather vehement, resistance to legal storytelling," id. at 256. Conversely,
literary scholars are interested in evidentiary issues: an issue of the Proceedings of the Modern
Language Association (PMLA) will be devoted to a special topic, "The Status of Evidence."
108 PROC. MOD. LANGUAGE ASS'N 399 (1993).
16. ALEXANDER WELSH, STRONG REPRESENTATIONS: NARRATIVE AND CIRCUMSTANTIAL EVIDENCE IN ENGLAND (1992).
17. Id. at 24.
18. Id. at 17.
19. Id. at 63.
20. RICHARDSON, supra note 2.
21. There is a large body of criticism on the novel. Seminal criticism relevant to my focus
includes TERRY CASTLE, CLARISSA'S CIPHERS: MEANING & DISRUPTION IN RICHARDSON'S
"CLARISSA" (1982); TERRY EAGLETON, THE RAPE OF CLARISSA: WRITING, SEXUALITY AND
CLASS STRUGGLE IN SAMUEL RICHARDSON (1982); WILLIAM BEATTY WARNER, READING
CLARISSA: THE STRUGGLES OF INTERPRETATION (1979). Two recent studies shed light on
law-related issues raised by the novel: KEYMER, supra note 2, and JOHN P. ZOMCHICK. FAMILY
AND THE LAW IN EIGHTEENTH-CENTURY FICTION: THE PUBLIC CONSCIENCE IN THE PRI-

(1993). Terry Castle describes the "basic cognitive activity that characters in
Clarissaperform" as "reading their experience." CASTLE, supra, at 50. She examines the way
in which "Clarissa remains a 'cypher' to those who surround her in the fictional world, a
subject for countless interpreters." Id. at 16. Thus, Castle is primarily concerned with Clarissa
as an object of others' readings, although she does examine Clarissa as a "naive exegete" who is
ultimately "a victim-of her own reading, and the readings of others." Id. at 57; see also id. at
95 ("Clarissa misreads the identity of virtually everyone she encounters."). I will focus exclusively on Clarissa as an epistemological subject.
22. Thus, in this Article, I do not attempt a full-scale reading of the novel, nor do I
address the evidentiary issues created by Richardson's avowed didactic purpose. See RICHARDSON, supra note 2, at 36; see also EAGLETON, supra note 21, at 24 (referring to Richardson as a
"properly didactic, propagandist writer"). As critics have implicitly recognized, Ian Watt's famous analogy between novel-reading and a jury trial, IAN WATT, THE RISE OF THE NOVEL:
STUDIES IN DEFOE, RICHARDSON, AND FIELDING 31 (1957), is particularly apt with respect to
VATE SPHERE
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ing the Lockean framework of eighteenth-century evidence law and

undermines the claim that "[c]ircumstances cannot lie.""3
II.

THE EIGHTEENTH-CENTURY ENGLISH LAW OF EVIDENCE

Attention to the origins of the Anglo-American law of evidence will
assist us in eliminating the "artificial[] separat[ion]" between the law

of evidence and the law of procedure,

4

because the law of evidence in

eighteenth-century England can best be understood in light of the

evolving nature of the jury.2" Although the history of the jury is contested and, ultimately, inconclusive,26 it seems clear that at some point
early in the jury's history, jurors "were permitted and indeed expected
to consider their personal knowledge of the facts in dispute in reaching
a verdict." 2 Jurors were required to be from the same neighborhood

Clarissa. See KEYMER, supra note 2, at 221 (stating that the novel is "the literary equivalent of
a trial"); CASTLE, supra note 21, at 138-39 ("When we attempt to interpret the epistolary text,
when we look for its 'Story,' we repeat the activity of characters attempting to decipher experience ...."); see also infra note 179.
23. WELSH, supra note 16, at 24; see SHAPIRO, supra note 6, at 217.
24. William Twining, The Boston Symposium: A Comment, 66 B.U. L. REV. 391, 396
(1986).
25. Peter Tillers has criticized Shapiro for "explain[ing] the emergence of rules of evidence
.. . by reference to this transformation of the trial jury." Tillers, Intellectual History, supra
note 12, at 1470. He suggests that consideration of other factors, including "procedural rules"
and "the role of ... the trial judge," would provide a "more satisfactory account of the origins
and persistence of the rules of evidence." Id. at 1471. However, other scholars also account for
the development of evidence law in terms of the jury's evolution. See TWINING, supra note 7, at
34. Attention to the relationship between the jury's role and the law of evidence was also sanctioned by Gilbert:
Now this in the first Place, is very plain, that when we can't see or hear any thing
ourselves, and yet are obliged to make a Judgment of it, we must see and hear by
Report from others; . . .and this is the Original of Tryals, and all manner of
Evidence.
GILBERT, supra note 8, at 3; see also [NELSON?], supra note 7, at 1-2 ("[I1t is call'd Evidence
because thereby the Point in Issue is to be made evident to the Jury."). It would be wrong to
oversimplify the role that transformation of the jury played in the development of the law of
evidence, and the factors suggested by Tillers undoubtedly played a part; for my purposes,
however, the "jury transformation" explanation is adequate.
26. See W.R. CORNISH, THE JURY 11 (1968); SHAPIRO, supra note 6, at 190-91. See
generally SIR PATRICK DEVLIN, TRIAL BY JURY 5-14 (1956) (discussing the "Origins of the
Jury System"); WILLIAM FORSYTH, HISTORY OF TRIAL BY JURY (James A. Morgan ed., 2d
ed. 1878) (1875) (discussing the history and nature of the jury system); THOMAS ANDREW
GREEN. VERDICT ACCORDING TO CONSCIENCE: PERSPECTIVES ON THE ENGLISH CRIMINAL
TRIAL JURY 1200-1800, at 3-20 (1985); 1 W.S. HOLDSWORTH. A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW

312-19 (3d ed. 1922); 2

SIR FREDERICK POLLOCK & FREDERIC WILLIAM MAITLAND. THE
HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW BEFORE THE TIME OF EDWARD I, at 616-32 (Boston, Little,

Brown & Co., 2d ed. 1898) (discussing the history and nature of the jury system).
27. John Marshall Mitnick, From Neighbor-Witness to Judge of Proofs: The Transformation of the English Civil Juror, 32 AM.J. LEGAL HIST. 201, 201 (1988).
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as the parties and were assumed to know the facts or to be capable of
learning them."8 Thus, it became "commonplace" to assert that " 'the
jurors were the witnesses.' "29 The transformation of jurqrs from
"largely self-informing knowers of the facts into fact evaluators who
reached verdicts on the basis of information and testimony introduced
in the court"" ° has been characterized by Shapiro as "one of the big
mysteries of English legal history."'" This mysterious transformation
gave impetus to the development of the law of evidence, because the
presentation of evidence in the courtroom was needed only insofar as
the jurors did not already know the facts.3 2 The appropriate role of the
jurors' own knowledge was at issue as late as 1670, in Bushell's
Case," s where Chief Justice Vaughn ruled on a habeas corpus petition
by one of the jurors who had acquitted William Penn and William
Mead. 4 In holding that jurors could not be fined for reaching a sincere, though, in the eyes of the judge, an incorrect, verdict, Vaughn
noted the requirement that the jury be drawn from the "vicinage" and
declared that "the law supposeth them thence to have sufficient knowledge to try the matter in issue . . . though no evidence were given on

28. 1 HOLDSWORTH, supra note 26, at 317. As Blackstone put it, "living in the
neighbourhood, they were . . . supposed to know beforehand the characters of the parties and
witnesses, and therefore they better knew what credit to give to the facts alleged in evidence." 3
WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *359; see also 1 HOLDSWORTH, supra note 26, at 333
("[lIt was perfectly clear that verdicts were not as a rule founded on first hand knowledge."); 2
POLLOCK & MAITLAND, supra note 26, at 624-25 ("[lit is the duty of the jurors, so soon as
they have been summoned, to make inquiries about the facts .... "); Mitnick, supra note 27, at
203-04 ("Although the jury was considered to speak from its collective personal knowledge, its
role was in fact understood to be investigatory."). Tillers asserts that even the "self-informing"
jury had to operate on the basis of evidence rules. Tillers, Intellectual History, supra note 12, at
1471. Thus, he contests the correlation between the denouement of the jury's self-informing
status and the development of the law of evidence. Id. at 1471-72; see also supra note 25 and
accompanying text. See generally 1 HOLDSWORTH, supra note 26, at 312-14 (examining jury's
origin as royal commissions of inquiry).
29. 2 POLLOCK & MAITLAND, supra note 26, at 622. But see id. at 617-18 (warning that
this statement oversimplifies the jury's role).
30. SHAPIRO, supra note 6, at 190.
31. Id.
32. See I HOLDSWORTH, supra note 26, at 333. "How a jury came by its knowledge was

not originally a matter with which the law concerned itself." Id. (emphasis added).
33. Bushell's Case, 124 Eng. Rep. 1006 (C.P. 1670).
34. The two were accused of "causing an unlawful assembly and a disturbance of the
peace." GREEN, supra note 26, at 222. See generally id. at 200-21; Mitnick, supra note 27, at
206-07; John A. Phillips & Thomas C. Thompson, Jurors v. Judges in Later Stuart England:
The Penn/Mead Trial and Bushell's Case, 4 LAW & INEQUALITY 189 (1986). Following the
"not guilty" verdict, the jurors, including Bushell, were fined by the court for bringing in a
verdict that was "contrary both to the evidence ('in matter of fact') and to the instructions ('in
matter of law')." GREEN, supra note 26, at 225; see Bushell's Case, 124 Eng. Rep. at 1007.
Bushell was imprisoned when he refused to pay the fine. GREEN, supra note 26, at 236.
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either side in Court."3' 5

Although Gilbert noted that "the Jury of their own Knowledge may
have further Light in the Fact than what they have from the Witnesses

in Court,""8 it is probable that the legitimacy of jurors' reliance on
their own knowledge had completely eroded by the mid-eighteenth
century." The impropriety of jurors' reliance on their own knowledge
in reaching a verdict gave greater epistemological leverage to the courtroom proceedings and greater salience to the law of evidence. With no

occult sources available, jurors became solely dependent upon the evidence presented in court, and the law of evidence became one means of

regulating jurors' knowledge and, by extension, the jury's verdict.3
The requirement that jurors have no personal knowledge of the facts
intersected with the requirement of juror impartiality. From a very

early date, it was recognized that the jury should be impartial. Fortescue defined the jury as "twelve good and lawful men of the
neighbourhood where the fact is alleged, who stand in no relation to
either of the parties at issue."3 9 He stated that "either party can challenge these ... by saying that the sheriff made the panel favourable to
the other party, viz. of persons not altogether impartial.'' 4 0 Blackstone

elaborated on the procedures for ensuring the impartiality of jurors.

35. Bushell's Case, 124 Eng. Rep. at 1012. See generally GREEN, supra note 26, at 23649; John H. Langbein, The Criminal Trial Before the Lawyers, 45 U. CHI. L. REV. 263, 298300 (1978). Assumptions about the jury's potential extrajudicial knowledge were implicit in the
abandonment of attaint as a means of jury control by the late seventeenth century and the

concomitant development of the new trial. See 3

WILLIAM BLACKSTONE. COMMENTARIES

*374-75; 1 HOLDSWORTH, supra note 26, at 337-47; Mitnick, supra note 27, at 209-18.
36. GILBERT, supra note 8, at 95.

37. See 3 WILLIAM

BLACKSTONE. COMMENTARIES

*375 ("[Tlhe practice... now univer-

sally obtains, that if a juror knows any thing of the matter in issue, he may be sworn as a
witness, and give his evidence publicly in court."); see also Mitnick, supra note 27, at 222-23
(arguing that establishment of the rule that "jurors were limited to evidence presefited in court"
occurred in 1726, with Chief Justice Raymond's ruling that "'if a jury man knows anything of
his own knowledge he ought not to acquaint his fellows with it privately, but must be sworn in
open court, for he is a witness ....
' " (quoting Constable v. Nichols (K.B. 1726), Bound
Manuscript Collection MS 1017 (fo. 83), Harvard Law School Library). But see Langbein,
supra note 35, at 298-99 n.105 (dating prohibition of jurors' reliance on their own knowledge to
1650 and noting that "Vaughn was being willfully anachronistic in basing his result in
Bushell's Case upon the self-informing character of the jury").
38. See Edward J. Imwinkelried, The Worst Evidence Principle: The Best Hypothesis as
to the Logical Structure of Evidence Law, 46 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1069, 1072-74 (1992) (characterizing the "Jury Control Hypothesis" as the traditional explanation for the development of
the law of evidence); see also id. at 1074-77 (discussing the "Best Evidence Hypothesis"); id. at
1077-99 (advocating a third explanation, the "Worst Evidence Principle"); infra text accompanying notes 57-65.
39. SIR JOHN FORTESCUE, DE LAUDIBUs LEGUM ANGLIE 57 (S.B. Chrimes, ed. & trans.,
1942).
40. Id.
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The sheriff was disqualified from summoning the jury if he "[was] not
an indifferent person; as if he [was] a party in the suit, or . . . related
by either blood or affinity to either of the parties. '4 1 A party could
challenge the array if the sheriff "array[ed] the panel at the nomination, or under the direction of either party."" 2 And individual jurors
could be challenged propter affectum, "for suspicion of bias or partiality."' ' So central had the principle of impartiality become by the mideighteenth century that Blackstone could praise the diminution of the
vicinage requirement by noting that "jurors, coming out of the immediate neighbourhood, would be apt to intermix their prejudices and partialities in the trial of right."' 44 For Blackstone, this partiality was a
''very natural and almost unavoidable inconvenience" that outweighed
any benefits from a first-hand knowledge of the facts. 4" The venerable
goal of juror impartiality was enhanced, therefore, by the prohibition
of jurors' reliance on their own knowledge.
Lacking either knowledge of the facts or an interest in the outcome
of the litigation, English jurors by the eighteenth century had evolved,
metaphorically, into Lockean blank slates, "white Paper, void of all
Characters, 4 6 prepared to have the truth inscribed upon them by the
evidence presented in court. 47 This image connotes utter passivity.
However, consistent with Locke's assertion that all knowledge derives
'
from "Sensation" and "Reflection," 48
Gilbert's formulation of the
jury's role emphasized their mental processes. Jurors had to weigh the
evidence and draw inferences from it; judging consisted of, first, perceiving the evidence and, then, interpreting it correctly.4 9

41. 3 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *354.

42. Id. at *359.
43. Id. at *363. Challenges propter affectum could be either "principal" or "to the favour." Id. Principal challenges were proper "where the cause assigned carrie[d] with it prima
facie evident marks of suspicion, either of malice or favour," such as the following:
that a juror [was] of kin to either party within the ninth degree; that he ha[d] been
arbitrator on either side; that he ha[d] an interest in the cause; that there [was] an
action depending between him and the party; that he ha[d] taken money for his
verdict; that he ha[d] formerly been a juror in the same cause; [or] that he [was]
the party's master, servant, counsellor, steward or attorney, or of the same society
or corporation with him.
Id. (footnote omitted). Challenges "to the favour" were proper where the party "object[ed] only

some probable circumstances of suspicion, as acquaintance and the like." Id.
44. Id. at *359-60.
45..Id. at *359.
46. LOCKE, supra note 1, at 104.
47. See JACKSON, supra note 15, at 112-13 (stating that the juror "is supposed to come to
the court like a tabula rasa, with no knowledge whatsoever of the situation-a blank space
waiting to be filled by facts as constructed through the testimony of witnesses").
48. LOCKE, supra note 1, at 105.
49. This isnot a precise Lockean description of the process. In Lockean terms, rendering a
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TREACHERY OF PERCEPTION

I According to Gilbert, the jury's duty was "to find the Truth of the
' 0
Fact in Question, according to the Evidence brought before them.'
To do this, the jury had to "range all Matters in the Scale of
Probability, so as to lay most Weight where the cause ought to preponderate."' 1 The "Scale of Probability," Gilbert explained, derived from
Locke's principle that "there are several Degrees from perfect Certainty and Demonstration, quite down to Improbability and Unlikeliness, even to the Confines of Impossibility."' 52 The quality of the evidence presented determined the likelihood of a fact sought to be
proved. The most reliable evidence, Gilbert explained, was "Demonstration," which he defined as "[t]he way of Knowledge by necessary
Inference [that] is founded on the View of a Man's own proper Senses,
by a Gradation of clear and distinct Perceptions.'5 Because demonstration was rarely available to the jury, however, jurors usually had to
rely on the less reliable forms of evidence, "testimony"-with written
documents considered more reliable than oral testimony" 4-and "presumptions," 55 which we would call factual inferences.56

verdict would require, first, Sensation, and then the exercise of the various "Faculties and Operations of the Mind," id. at 161, including, at least, "perception," "retention," "discerning," and
"abstracting," id. at 143-63. Juror passivity is also belied by eighteenth-century trial records
showing that jurors questioned witnesses and communicated directly with the bench during the
trial. See Langbein, supra note 35, at 288; cf. Pennington & Hastie, supra note 15, at 523
("[Jiurors engage in an active, constructive, comprehension process in which evidence is organized, elaborated, and interpreted by them during the course of the trial.").
50. GILBERT, supra note 8, at 32. Gilbert thus accepted a central tenet of the "rationalist
tradition" of evidence, that adjudication involves "the pursuit of truth about particular past
events through rational means." TWINING, supra note.7, at 78.
51. GILBERT, supra note 8, at 1-2.
52. Id. at 1.
53. Id. at 2-3. Gilbert apparently believed that the highest form of knowledge in Locke's
system, "intuitive Knowledge," LOCKE, supra note 1, at 531, was unavailable in adjudication.
See GILBERT, supra note 8, at 2.
54. GILBERT, supra note 8, at 4-5.
55. Id.at 112.
56.. Although the civil law origin of the term "presumptions" may have led to a technical
distinction between presumptions and inferences of fact, see SHAPIRO, supra note 6, at 200-06, I
am referring to "presumptions" in the following sense: "Presumptions of fact are the inferences
that followed from circumstantial evidence." Id. at 207. The 1729 edition of Giles Jacob's law
dictionary uses the term "presumptive" evidence: "And though presumptive and circumstantial
Evidence may be sufficient in Felony; it is not so in Treason." GILES JACOB, A NEW LAWDICTIONARY (London, E. & R. Nutt et al. 1729). Wigmore noted: "An earlier term for this
class [circumstantial evidence] was 'presumptive evidence.' The distinction between 'presumption' in the sense of a mere circumstantial inference and in the sense of a rule of procedure
affecting the duty of proof has in modern times led to confusion." JOHN HENRY WIGMORE,
THE SCIENCE OF JUDICIAL PROOF

§ 6, at 12 n.1 (3d ed. 1937). See generally Ronald J. Allen,

Presumptionsin Civil Actions Reconsidered, 66 IOWA L. REV. 843 (1981) (discussing confusion
in the use of the term "presumption" and the various roles played by presumptions in civil
actions). The modern definition of circumstantial evidence is as follows: "any fact (sometimes
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Gilbert's hierarchy of evidence embodied the primary principle of
evidence that had developed by the eighteenth century: the best evidence rule."7 Although this rule has been attributed to "the commonlaw judges' fear that untrained jurors w[ould] attach undue weight to
particular kinds of evidence, '""8 Gilbert's justification for the rule suggests a different rationale: "[T]he farther off a Thing lies from the first
Original Truth, so much the weaker must the Evidence be . ...
Clearly, Gilbert here was influenced by Locke's view of knowledge
acquisition, in which "the isolated, indivisible individual" is the "indecomposable epistemological unit."' Locke's "confidence in cognitive
autonomy and self-sufficiency"61 meant that anything that intervenes
between the individual and the fact sought to be proved jeopardizes the
individual's perception of truth, not so much because the individual's
reasoning powers are suspect,62 but because the evidence itself becomes
subject to falsification.63 Gilbert recognized this: "[I]f a Man offers a
Copy of a Deed or Will where he ought to produce the Original, this
carries a Presumption with it that there is something more in the Deed
or Will that makes against the Party, or else he wou'd have produced
it .... ,""More specifically, Gilbert noted, "[Tihe Deed is much bet-

called an 'evidentiary fact', factum probans,or 'fact relevant to the issue') from the existence of
which the judge or jury may infer the existence of a fact in issue (sometimes called a 'principal
fact' or factum probandum)." JACKSON, supra note 15, at 9.
57. TWINING, supra note 7, at 188 ("Gilbert tried to subsume all the rules of evidence
under a single principle, the 'best evidence rule'. . . .").It is important to distinguish the
modern best evidence rule, which applies only to written documents, see Dale A. Nance, The
Best Evidence Principle, 73 IowA L. REV. 227, 256-63 (1988), from the eighteenth-century
version of the rule, which applied to all types of evidence. As Blackstone phrased it, "the one
general rule that runs through all the doctrine of trials is this, that the best evidence the nature

of the case will admit of shall always be required." 3 WILLIAM

BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES

*368. See generally Stephan Landsman, From Gilbert to Bentham: The Reconceptualization of
Evidence Theory, 36 WAYNE L. REV. 1149, 1149-60 (1990).
58. Imwinkelried, supra note 38, at 1070; see Nance, supra note 57, at 278-79.

59.

GILBERT,

60.

JOEL C. WEINSHEIMER,

supra note 8, at 6-7.
EIGHTEENTH-CENTURY HERMENEUTICS:

INTERPRETATION IN ENGLAND FROM LOCKE TO BURKE

PHILOSOPHY OF

28 (1993).

61. Id. at 38.
62. See Imwinkelried, supra note 38, at 1072 ("[J]udges formulated the rules with a view
toward restraining the irrational behavior of weak-minded jurors.").
63. When viewed in this light, perhaps, the best evidence rule simply assumes Imwinkelried's "worst evidence rule." See supra note 38 and accompanying text. Explaining his
thesis, Imwinkelried notes, "[Riather than primarily fearing the misevaluation of evidence by
jurors, the judges were principally concerned about perjury by witnesses." Imwinkelried, supra
note 38, at 1071. But Imwinkelried's two clauses may express, not alternative explanations for
the best evidence rule, but, rather, a causal relationship: judges "fear[ed] the misevaluation of
evidence by jurors" because they were "concerned about perjury by witnesses" and other forms
of falsification of evidence.

64.

GILBERT,

supra note 8, at 13.
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ter Evidence than the Copy of it, for the Rasure and Interlineation
that might vacate the Deed, might appear in the Deed itself.'
Thus,
Gilbert's hierarchy of evidence goes not just to the subjective assent
that each type of evidence commands, but also to the objective conditions for the jury's acquisition of knowledge. The best evidence rule
implicitly recognizes the instability even of documents, their vulnerability to tampering that would cause misperception of their true
nature.
Oral testimony, which Gilbert termed "Proofs from the Mouths of
Witnesses,''66 substitutes the report of one person's sense impressions
for the juror's direct experience: "Probability arises from the Agreement of any Thing with a Man's own Thoughts and Observations
from the Testimony of others who have seen and heard it."' 67 In Gilbert's scheme, the least reliable form of evidence was hearsay, which
indeed "is no Evidence," because "nothing can be more uncertain than
the loose and wandering Witnesses that are taken upon the uncertain
Reports of the Talk and Discourse of others."6 8 In the absence of intuitive knowledge,69 all evidence is substitutionary, but Gilbert emphasized this aspect of circumstantial evidence:
When the Fact itself cannot be proved, that which comes nearest to
the Proof of the Fact is, the Proof of the Circumstances that necessarily and usually attend such Facts, and these are called Presumptions
and not Proofs, for they stand instead of the Proofs of the Fact till
the contrary be proved.7 0
Apparently, Gilbert did not share the cautious attitude about circumstantial evidence that Shapiro attributes to Coke and Hale. 71 Although
Gilbert rejected consideration of "light and rash Presumptions [that]
weigh nothing, 7' 2 he valorized circumstantial evidence in explaining
the low value of hearsay testimony: "That which renders his Testi-

65. Id. at 69-70.

66. Id. at 86.
67. Id. at 104. Following the canon law, Gilbert ranked oral testimony according to the
number of witnesses and the nature of their testimony. See supra note 11 and accompanying
text; 9 HOLDSWORTH, supra note 26, at 203-11. He asserted that "[t]he first and lowest Proof
is the Oath of one Witness only," GILBERT, supra note 8, at 106, and he discussed, under
separate heads, "One Witness, Hearsay Evidence," "Two Witnesses," and "Two Witnesses,
contrary Proofs," id. at 106, 108, 109.
68. GILBERT, supra note 8, at 107-08.
69. See supra note 53.

70.

GILBERT,

supra note 8, at 112.

71. Barbara Shapiro, CircumstantialEvidence: Of Law, Literature, and Culture, 5 YALE
J.L. & HUMAN. 219, 232 (1993) (reviewing ALEXANDER WELSH, STRONG REPRESENTATIONS:
NARRATIVE AND CIRCUMSTANTIAL EVIDENCE IN ENGLAND (1992)).
72. GILBERT, supra note 8, at 112.
,
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mony doubtful is the Attestation of the several Circumstances, and yet
no Proof of any one of those Circumstances to fall in with what he
attests . . . .
Just as Locke implied a shared body of experience among his readers by consistently appealing to the reader's own "Experience" and
"Observation," 7 4 so Gilbert assumed that eighteenth-century jurors,
who were generally required to be free, male, property-holding English subjects,76 would share a common core of experience. Gilbert
classified presumptions as either "violent" or "probable," "according
as the several Circumstances sworn do more or less usually accompany
the Fact to be proved."71 6 He asserted that, in evaluating the proof of a
single witness, jurors must refer to their own experience, "for if the
Fact be contrary to all manner of Experience and Observation, 'tis too
much to receive it upon the Oath of one Witness."' 7 Thus, the image
of a juror as a blank slate proved inapt, not only because jurors were
not passive receptors of the evidence, but also because they were expected to bring to bear a store of knowledge deriving from observation
and experience.78

73. Id. at 106.
74. See, e.g., LOCKE, supra note 1, at 91, 103, 162, 254.

75. 3 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *361-63. But see James C. Oldham, The
Origins of the Special Jury, 50 U. CHI. L.REV. 137, 167-72 (1983) (discussing special juries of
aliens and matrons).
76. GILBERT, supra note 8, at 112-13. In An Abstract of Mr. Locke's Essay on Human
Understanding,Gilbert recognized that determinations of probability are products of "Observation and Experience." JEFFREY GILBERT, AN ABSTRACT OF MR.LOCKE'S ESSAY ON HUMAN
UNDERSTANDING 44 (Dublin, William Sandby 1752). After noting that "general and universal" experience yields the highest probability, id. at 45, Gilbert invoked Locke's hypothetical
conversation between the Dutch ambassador and the King of Siam, see LOCKE, supra note 1, at
656-57, to illustrate the principle that "what may seem probable to one Man, or in some Places,
seems improbable in others, according to the Difference of their Observation and Experience,"
GILBERT, supra, at 46-47. However, in his treatise on evidence, Gilbert did not find it necessary
to discuss the implications of this insight.
77. Id. at 106.
78. The kind of "observation and experience" assumed by Locke and Gilbert may produce
the "commonsense presumptions" that, in Cohen's view, "license" juror inferences. L.
JONATHAN COHEN, THE PROBABLE AND THE PROVABLE 247-48 (1977); see also id. at 251
(explaining that the juror must assess inductive probabilities in evaluating both "direct" and
"circumstantial" evidence). Cohen is generally acknowledged as the leading proponent of a Baconian (non-Pascalian) model of inferential reasoning. See, e.g., Twining, supra note 24, at 392;
see infra note 12. For a survey of four proposed models of juror decision making, see Reid
Hastie, Introduction to INSIDE THE JUROR: THE PSYCHOLOGY OF JUROR DECISION MAKING
3, 10-28 (Reid Hastie ed., 1993). Lockean "observation and experience" may also correlate
with Pennington and Hastie's "world knowledge." Pennington & Hastie, supra note 15, at 523
("[S]tories are constructed by reasoning from world knowledge and from evidence."); see also
Allen, supra note 10, at 618 & n.39 (asking the reader to "consult his or her own knowledge"
as proof that "[pleople do not carry around in their brains relative frequency or likelihood tables
relevant to life in general").
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CLARISSA AS EPISTEMOLOGICAL TRAGEDY

Clarissa's story 79 may be seen as the tragedy8 ° that befalls a young

Cohen's description of the information jurors need in order to assess inductive probabilities
suggests congruence with Locke's concept of "observation and experience":
The inductivist analysis ... presupposes only that when a juryman takes up
his office his mind is already adult and stocked with a vast number of commonplace generalizations about human acts, attitudes, intentions, etc., about the more
familiar features of the human environment, and about the interactions between
these two kinds of factor, together with an awareness of many of the kinds of
circumstances that are favourable or unfavourable to the application of each such
generalization. Without this stock of information in everyday life he could understand very little about his neighbours, his colleagues, his business competitors, or
his wife. He would be greatly handicapped in explaining their past actions or
predicting their future ones. But with this information he has the only kind of
background data he needs in practice for the assessment of inductive probabilities
in the jury-room ....
...The main commonplace generalizations themselves are for the most part
too essential a part of our culture for there to be any serious disagreement about
them. They are learned from shared experiences, or taught by proverb, myth,
legend, history, literature, drama, parental advice, and the mass media ....
COHEN, supra, at 274-75. Cohen's vocabulary is gender-specific, but he obviously intends this
description to apply to all persons within a given culture. See id. at 275. He does admit that
"there is still room for occasional disagreement, even within the same culture, about the kinds of
circumstance that are favourable or unfavourable to the application of some particular commonsense generalization." Id. Presumably, given the sources Cohen identifies for the shared generalizations, differences inscribed within a culture will diminish the commonality of the generalizations. Cf. Pennington & Hastie, supra note 15, at 525 ("Because all jurors hear the same
evidence and have the same general knowledge about the expected structure of stories, differences in story construction must arise from differences in world knowledge; that is, differences
in experiences and beliefs about the social world."). But cf. Joan W. Scott, The Evidence of
Experience, 17 CRITICAL INQUIRY 773, 779 (1991) ("[W]e need to attend to the historical
processes that, through discourse, position subjects and produce their experiences. It is not individuals who have experience, but subjects who are constituted through experience.").
79. Clarissa Harlowe, the beautiful, virtuous daughter of a wealthy middle-class family,
inherits estates from her grandfather. She attracts the attentions of a handsome, charming, but
debauched aristocrat, Robert Lovelace. Her family's social ambitions and their distaste for
Lovelace lead them to propose a wealthy but uncouth neighbor, Solmes, as her suitor. As a
result of her family's increasingly oppressive behavior, Clarissa fears that they will force her
assent to the marriage with Solmes. Consequently, she becomes receptive to Lovelace's proposal.
Unable to persuade Clarissa to elope, Lovelace stages an "abduction" by her family, from which
he "rescues" her. Clarissa leaves her home with Lovelace; her family disowns her; and when
she hesitates to place herself under the protection of Lovelace's noble relatives, he installs her in
a London brothel, which he misrepresents as the home of a respectable widow and her nieces.
After months of confinement, in which her friend, Anna Howe, is her only regular correspondent, Clarissa escapes to Hampstead, where Lovelace finds her. He tricks her into returning to
London by hiring two of his female friends to impersonate his noble aunt and cousin, who
promise Clarissa their protection if she returns. Back in London, once again forcibly imprisoned
in the brothel, Clarissa is raped by Lovelace. She finally escapes and takes up separate lodgings;
she is never reconciled with her family; and she eventually withers away and dies.
Other readers have characterized the story differently. Hester Thrale Piozzi wrote, "There
is no Story . . . A Man gets a Girl from her Parents-violates her Free Will, & She dies of a
broken heart. That is all the Story." KEYMER, supra note 2, at 48 (quoting Piozzi's marginalia,
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woman when she attempts to judge her own life according to Gilbertian principles. Evidentiary issues are raised in the very first letter of
the novel. Writing to Clarissa, Anna Howe notes that, as a result of
the "disturbances that have happened in [Clarissa's] family,""1 she has
"become the subject of the public talk."8 2 Anna recounts the eyewitness
testimony of Mr. Wyerley and Mr. Symmes about the duel between
James Harlowe and Lovelace 8 and reports her friends' apprehensions
for Clarissa and their opinion of Lovelace. 4 However, Anna is not
satisfied with these sources. With respect to the "disturbances," she
tells Clarissa, "I long to have the particulars from yourself ....
Anna wishes, "on the authority of [Clarissa's] own information," to do
' For this purpose, she demands direct
her friend "occasional justice." 86
evidence: "Write to me therefore, my dear, the whole of your story
. .. .,, Perhaps sensing the role her grandfather's will plays in the
family's animosity toward Clarissa, Anna also seeks documentary evidence, requesting "a copy of the preamble to the clauses in your

British Library, 10856.ee.9). In Terry Eagleton's view, "Clarissa is the story of a young woman
of outstanding kindness, virtue and intelligence who is made to suffer under a violently oppressive family, is tricked away from home by a notorious sexual predator, deceived, imprisoned,
persecuted, drugged and raped, and finally impelled to her death." EAGLETON, supra note 21,
at 63-64; see also RICHARDSON, supra note 2, at 1206 (Mr. John Belford's version of Clarissa's

story).
Clearly, I read the novel as assuming the existence of an objective reality and having an

"action" that is narrated by the letters. See

JANET GURKIN ALTMAN, EPISTOLARITY: APPROACHES TO A FORM 200-01 (1982). Other critics have suggested that the novel represents no

reality and tells no single story apart from the letters themselves. See CASTLE, supra note 21, at
21, 54-55; WARNER, supra note 21, at 5 ("[W]e shall find nothing in the novel that we can call
neutral, objective, or true."). But the critics who take this position still speak as though there
are real events underlying the letters, asserting, for instance, that Mrs. Sinclair's abode is a
brothel. See CASTLE, supra note 21, at 94-101; WARNER, supra note 21, at 56-74; see also
EAGLETON, supra note 21, at 66. The critics have also questioned the sincerity of Clarissa's

version of events, see DAVID

GOLDKNOPF, THE LIFE OF THE NOVEL

72-73 (1972);

WARNER,

supra note 21, at 10-14, 87-89, 95, but as I read her letters, and those of the other correspondents, the letters taken together are reliable testimony to the action of the novel. For example,
Clarissa's early letters about Mrs. Sinclair's house do not convey the fact that it is a brothel, but
the reader learns that from Lovelace's letters. Critics can and do discuss the nature of Mrs.
Sinclair's house as a matter of fact. Thus, I agree with Keymer that the correspondents in
Clarissa "agree on the basic facts" but "offer ... radically adversarial constructions of them."
KEYMER,

supra note 2, at 230.

80. Terry Castle describes Clarissa's ordeal as a "hermeneutic disaster."
note 21, at 59.

81.

RICHARDSON,

82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.

Id.

Id.
Id. at 40.
Id. at 39.
Id. at 40.
Id.

supra note 2, at 39.

CASTLE,

supra

19941
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grandfather's will." '
The novel is rife with legal metaphor, in which Clarissa is frequently presented, as in Anna's initial letter, as a party. With respect
to her parents, she is the defendant, charged with undutiful behavior.
She refers to "my power to plead my own cause";9 she laments, "I am
deprived of the opportunity of defending myself!" 90 After the abduction, Lovelace's object of "bring[ing] virtue to a trial" ' once more casts
her in the role of defendant. After the rape, she becomes the plaintiff
or prosecutor of Lovelace.9 2 But Clarissa also refers explicitly to her
role as judge. Early in her relationship with Lovelace, she declares, "I
would judge him . . . by his actions, not by his professions."93 At
Hampstead, she demands, "Let me judge for myself upon what I shall
see, not upon what I shall hear. . . . " Thus, although the trial analogy allows Clarissa to play many roles,95 I will focus upon Clarissa as
juror, attempting to discern from the evidence the truth of her
situation.96
In many respects, Clarissa is the perfect eighteenth-century juror.
Clarissa's story has been characterized as one of "compulsion and isolation," 9 echoing the jury's situation: compelled to serve, 98 epistemologically isolated in the courtroom, and physically isolated during their

88. Id.
89. Id. at 115.
90. Id. at 206.
91. Id. at 608.
92. See KEYMER, supra note 2, at 224. However, she rejects her friends' suggestion that
she actually prosecute Lovelace. RICHARDSON, supra note 2, at 1251-57; see CASTLE, supra
note 21, at 128; ZOMCHICK, supra note 21, at 96-99.
93. RICHARDSON, supra note 2, at 171.
94. Id. at 777.
95. Warner asserts that she is "at once defendant, prosecutor, and judge," WARNER, supra
note 21, at 24, as well as her own advocate, who "shapes, tames, and controls her world," id. at
113, and the story of her life, id. at 75-76.
96. The analogy is imperfect in two important respects. First, Clarissa is not impartial, see
infra text accompanying notes 111-18; she is vitally interested in the verdict. But see Gerard A.
Barker, The Complacent Paragon: Exemplary Characterization in Richardson, 9 STUD. ENG.
LITERATURE 503, 503 (1969) (Clarissa's story "is rooted ultimately in the Protestant scheme of
salvation with its basic belief in the validity of self-judgment."). Second, the jury was required
to judge past truth; Clarissa's judgment, for the most part, is directed to present events and
motives. It may also be objected that Clarissa would not have been eligible to serve on an actual

eighteenth-century jury because of her sex, see 3

WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES

*362, and that the evidentiary principles articulated by Gilbert were intended for use only in a
courtroom. However, Locke's theory of knowledge, which Gilbert adapted, does purport to apply generally, regardless of the knower's situation or gender.
97. Anthony Kearney, Clarissa and the Epistolary Form, 16 ESSAYS IN CRITICISM 44, 45
(1966).
98. 3 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE. COMMENTARIES *354.
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deliberations.9 9 Before the abduction, she grows increasingly estranged
from her family, her friends, and her spiritual advisers, and, throughout the ordeal that follows the abduction, she is required to discern the
truth on the basis of evidence presented to her by others. But Gilbert's
hierarchy of evidence utterly fails as hearsay proves to be an important
source of accurate information, written documents prove subject to
tampering, and Clarissa's own perceptions betray her. Hearsay, completely disqualified from consideration under the rules of evidence,
proves more reliable than the evidence of Clarissa's own eyes and ears.
The tragedy of the virtuous heroine, who by definition can have no
''experience," exposes the assumptions underlying these principles and
the way in which "truth is always a matter of power and position." 10 0
In the first part of the novel, Clarissa's task is to judge her parents'
intentions with respect to her marriage to Solmes. The methods that
her parents use to try to persuade Clarissa to accept Solmes place her
in informational isolation analogous to that of the impartial eighteenth-century juror."' Very early on, her parents refuse to hear her
objections to Solmes.'0 2 Whenever Clarissa attempts to state her position, she is accused of "prepossessions"' 3 or "prejudices" ' ' in favor of
Lovelace. She is kept from attending church, forbidden to receive visits
from her spiritual mentor, Mrs. Norton, and forbidden to correspond
with anyone outside the house."'0 The household keys are taken from
her, and her servant, Hannah, is discharged." 6 Eventually, she is forbidden to write to or to see any of her family, 0 7 and her pens and ink
are removed.' 0 8 In the period immediately preceding the abduction, her
only legitimate sources of information are the maid, Betty Barnes, and
her Aunt Hervey.' 0 9 From the very inception of the novel, Clarissa is
"epistemologically disadvantaged."" 0

99. Id. at *375-76 (After retiring to deliberate, the jurors "are to be kept without meat,
drink, fire, or candle" and cannot "speak with either of the parties or their agents" or "receive
any fresh evidence in private.").
100. EAGLETON, supra note 21, at 79.
101. Cf. ZOMCHICK, supra note 21, at 74 ("[T]he Harlowes subject Clarissa to a kind of
... ).
psychological peine forte et dure.
102. RICHARDSON, supra note 2, at 61.
103. Id. at 108.
104. Id. at 254.
105. Id. at 63, 82.
106. Id. at 116, 119.
107. Id. at 265.
108. Id. at 320.
109. Id. at 244, 325, 346-48.
110. KEYMER, supra note 2, at 177. Thus, Janet Altman misses the mark in asserting that
the dominance of Clarissa's viewpoint early in the novel indicates that she is "the most omniscient observer at the time." ALTMAN, supra note 79, at 170.
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Of course, the Harlowe family's purpose is not to render Clarissa
impartial. On the contrary, they wish her to become partial to Solmes.
But their insistence on depriving Clarissa of multiple sources of knowledge in an effort to make her solely dependent upon them, their attempt to telescope her frame of reference, simply renders Clarissa's
judgment unreliable. Most importantly, the limitation of her legitimate
sources of knowledge magnifies the reliability of Lovelace's illegitimate
sources. Confined to her room, forbidden to communicate with her
family or her spiritual advisers, Clarissa is forced to interpret the
"hurry below-stairs" and Betty Barnes' "dark hints.""'1 Clarissa exclaims in exasperation, "Something is working, I know not what ...
Indeed I am quite heart-sick!"" ' 2 In contrast to Clarissa, Lovelace
"knows everything that is done here; and that as soon as done.""' His
declaration that she will be forced to marry Solmes," 4 a conviction
Anna shares,"' is repeatedly confirmed by everyone with whom Clarissa is.allowed to communicate: her Uncle Antony," 6 her Aunt Hervey and Dolly Hervey," 7 and Betty Barnes. " ' Thus, the information
that her family provides her supports Lovelace's veracity; his evidence
weighs more heavily with Clarissa because it is consistent with the
other, legitimate evidence. Despite her misgivings about Lovelace's
character, Clarissa comes to trust the evidence with which he presents
her.
The credit that her family's behavior unwittingly grants to Lovelace
provides an unfortunate backdrop for her efforts to judge his actions
and intentions. Clarissa's efforts to discover the truth about Lovelace's
behavior challenge Gilbert's denigration of hearsay and valorization of
written documents. For Clarissa and Anna, whose freedom of movement is limited by social convention, hearsay is an important source of
information." 9 Throughout the novel, hearsay from Anna and Mr.

111. RICHARDSON, supra note 2, at 328.
112. Id.
113. Id. at 366; see also id. at 325 ("[N]othing passes in this house, but he knows it; and
that, as soon as it passes.").
114. Id. at 326.
115. Id. at 239.
116. Id. at 305.
117. Id. at 337, 364.
118. Id. at 339.
119. Gilbert treats hearsay as a species of oral testimony, but, of course, the information
contained in the letters Clarissa receives is also hearsay: because the letters originate outside her
presence, they are "out of court" statements, and Clarissa certainly treats the information conveyed as purporting to be truthful. Because the hearsay that proves reliable reaches Clarissa
through letters, it is actually "double" hearsay. After the abduction, letters are Clarissa's only
source of truth, because Lovelace orchestrates virtually everything that occurs in her presence.
See, e.g., RICHARDSON, supra note 2, at 681-97 (describing the Tomlinson episode, in which
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Hickman generally proves accurate. For example, Hickman's report of
what Lovelace's friends, Mowbray and Belton, say about his character
1 20
is nothing but hearsay, yet it accurately portrays his lack of morals.
Anna's information about Lovelace's relationship with Rosebud is accurate. 121 Finally, Anna's account of Miss Lardner's assessment of
Mrs. Sinclair's house is the quintessence of hearsay, yet it proves to be
correct: "At last, she revealed it, but in confidence, to Miss Biddulph,
by letter. Miss Biddulph, in like confidence . . .communicated it to
Miss Lloyd; and so, like a whispered scandal, it passed through several
canals [sic]; and then it came to me. '"12
Clarissa's tragedy is that she does not or cannot make use of these
hearsay reports; she would have been better off, the novel suggests, had
she relied on hearsay. Of course, not all hearsay is so reliable. The two
most noteworthy instances of unreliable hearsay are the Singleton
plot 1 23 and Rev. Brand's report of Clarissa's behavior after her escape
from Lovelace. 2 4 These uses of hearsay by, respectively, an intentionally deceitful and a stupidly officious man do not, however, diminish
the usefulness of hearsay from trustworthy sources.
Just as hearsay frequently proves valuable, so written documents in
the novel often prove treacherous. Gilbert assigned documents "the
first place in the Discourses of Probability," primarily because, unlike
oral testimony, they are not "liable to the Imperfections of Memory." 25 The issue raised with respect to documents in the novel, however, is not their accuracy, but the condition precedent to accuracy,
their authenticity. 2 6 According to Gilbert, authenticity was guaranteed
by the "Hand and Seal" of the maker. 2 In the novel, of course, Lovelace makes short work of these safeguards, effectively imitating Anna's
and Clarissa's handwriting and surreptitiously breaking and replacing
seals.1 28 At the critical Hampstead juncture, Lovelace forges three let-

one of Lovelace's friends masquerades as a friend of Clarissa's uncle interested in promoting a
reconciliation between her and her family). Of course, tovelace also creates false hearsay in the
letter from Doleman describing the "widow's" lodgings. Id. at 469-71.
120. Id. at 214.
121. Id. at 284-87.
122. Id. at 746.
123. E.g., id. at 640.
124. Id. at 1292-95.
125. GILBERT, supra note 8, at 5.
126. Cf. Twining, supra note 12, at 216 (noting Bentham's criticism of Gilbert for "confusing verity and authenticity of documents").
127. GILBERT, supra note 8, at 73.
128. See EAGLETON, supra note 21, at 50 ("Letters ... are waylaid, forged, stolen, lost,
copied . .

").
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ters: the warning letter from Anna to Clarissa,' 2 9 Clarissa's response to
this letter, 3 and the letter from "Lady Elizabeth Lawrance" informing Lovelace that "Miss Montague" has been taken ill. 1"' Each of
these letters contributes to Clarissa's decision to return to London and
her eventual re-imprisonment and rape. Throughout the period following the abduction, Clarissa would have benefitted more from one faceto-face encounter with Anna than from all her letters.
Even the evidence from her own eyes and ears deceives Clarissa because she fails to draw the correct inferences from it.'" 2 The first major
incident in which Clarissa draws the incorrect inference is, of course,
the abduction itself. Clarissa vividly recounts both the facts and her
inferences from them. She hears Lovelace's warning, "They are at the
door, my beloved creature!" and someone's shouts from within the
gate; she sees someone "bursting against the door," giving it "violent
pushes."' 3 3 She sees Lovelace draw his sword; she hears him urge her
to ,"[flly" and predict, "Your brother!-your uncles! or this
Solmes!-they will instantly burst the door!""'3 Her account of their
flight to the chariot shows how each sense impression led to a chain of
inferences supporting the interpretation that her family was attempting
to restrain her by force:
Now behind me, now before me, now on this side, now on that,
turned I my affrighted face in the same moment; expecting a furious
brother here, armed servants there, an enraged sister screaming and a

father armed with terror in his countenance, more dreadful than even
the drawn sword which I saw or those I apprehended.... I beheld
a man, who must have come out of the garden door, keeping us in his
eye, running backward and forward, beckoning and calling out to
others, whom I supposed he saw, although the turning of the wall

129. RICHARDSON, supra note 2, at 811-14.
130. Id. at 815.
131. Id. at 880.
132. In this discussion, I deliberately conflate Gilbert's concept that direct sensory perception leads to "Knowledge by necessary Inference," GILBERT, supra note 8, at 2, which he
termed "Demonstration," with his concept of circumstantial evidence, the notion that facts can
be proved by "Proof of the Circumstances that necessarily and usually attend such Facts," id. at
112. This conflation reflects the fact that Gilbert's evidentiary hierarchy was premised, not only
on the inherent characteristics of the evidence (written versus unwritten), but also on the relationship between the evidence produced and the fact to be proved. In Clarissa's case, the ultimate fact to be proved is Lovelace's villainy, which would be subject only to circumstantial
evidence. But intermediate facts, such as the identity of the ladies at Hampstead, are also at
issue in Clarissa, and these facts are subject to demonstration. The two categories of evide.nce
are related by Gilbert's confidence in the "necessary" inferential relationship between the evidence and the fact to be proved. As we shall see, Clarissa's story critiques that confidence.
133. RICHARDSON, supra note 2, at 379-80.
134. Id. at 380.
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hindered me from seeing them; and whom I imagined to be my
brother, my father and their servants."' 3
Although Clarissa quickly realizes that she was "cheated" into going
with Lovelace,"3 6 she also realizes that, to her family, her flight must
appear "preconcerted, forward, and artful."1 7 And, of course, Lovelace has contrived the evidence at the scene so that her family will
infer, as they do, that she went consensually. 3 "
The second failure of direct sensory perception is Clarissa's residence at Mrs. Sinclair's. Her first information about the house comes
via a letter from Doleman 3 9 and is therefore second-hand. But when
she is introduced to the house, the "widow," and the "nieces," she still
fails to judge accurately the nature of the place, even though she has
more time and a calmer frame of mind in which to examine the evidence. Clarissa's closet contains Sally's and Polly's library, plus a few
books of devotion that Lovelace adds. 4" Upon examining the books,
which include Dryden, Pope, Swift, Addison, and Shakespeare, Clarissa draws an ironic inference about their owners: "[I] think the better
of the people of the house for their sakes."""1 Other evidence about the
character of the "non-apparents," as Lovelace calls them,14 2 is ambiguous. Clarissa calls them "agreeable young women enough in their persons; but they seemed to put on an air of reserve." 4 ' Indeed, Clarissa
sees evidence that their relationship with Lovelace is not congruent
with the ostensible situation:
Only that circumstances, and what passed in conversation, encouraged not the notion, or I should have been apt to think that the
young gentlewomen and Mr Lovelace were of longer acquaintance
than yesterday. For he, by stealth as it were, cast glances sometimes
at them, which they returned; and, on my ocular notice, their eyes
fell, as I may say, under my eye, as if they could not stand its
examination. 14 '
Clarissa does not specify the "circumstances" that failed to support her
suspicion of the women. Here, ironically, she errs in devaluing her
own perceptions, her "ocular notice," and relying too heavily on the
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absence of corroborating circumstances.
Clarissa also perceives discrepancies in Dorcas' appearance and behavior. Lovelace tells Belford that "Dorcas is a neat girl both in person
and dress; a countenance not vulgar."' 4 5 When introduced to Clarissa,
she "behaved very modestly-overdid it a little perhaps!"' 4 Yet Clarissa notes that "[sihe is very likely and genteel; too genteel indeed, I
think, for a servant."' 4 7 She also dislikes Dorcas' "strange sly eye...
half-confident, I think.' 4 8 Despite her reservations about Dorcas, Clarissa fails to detect Lovelace's lie about her illiteracy:
She is not only genteel, but is well-bred, and well-spoken. She must
have had what is generally thought to be the polite part of education:
but it is strange that fathers and mothers should make so light, as
they generally do, of that preferable part in girls, which would improve their minds and give a grace to all the rest. 4"
Neither does Clarissa detect Mrs. Sinclair. She cautions Anna,
"[Y]ou must not ask me how I like the old gentlewoman. Yet she
seems courteous and obliging."' 150 She observes that, like Dorcas, the
widow has an eye that gives cause for suspicion, "an odd winking
eye."'' Although Clarissa notes that Mrs. Sinclair's sentimental account of her late husband "moved me a good deal in her favour," she
also notes that Mrs. Sinclair did not wet her handkerchief, although
she wished Clarissa to believe she did.'5 2 A final ground for suspicion
of Mrs. Sinclair is her too-respectful demeanor. When they first meet,
Clarissa infers that "her respectfulness seems too much studied, methinks, for the London ease and freedom.' 53 Later, Clarissa observes
that Mrs. Sinclair behaves more respectfully toward her "than should
be from distance of years, as she was the wife of a gentleman; and as
the appearance of everything about her, as well house as dress, carries
54
the marks of such good circumstances as require not abasement.'
Again, Clarissa allows "circumstances" to neutralize the other evidence
of Mrs. Sinclair's true nature.
Finally, Clarissa fails to recognize the impersonation of Lady Betty
Lawrance and Miss Charlotte Montague. Clarissa describes the im-
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postors as "richly dressed and stuck out with jewels." 15' 5 Consistent
with their reputations, the putative Lady Betty is "a fine woman," and
Charlotte is "a beautiful young lady, genteel and graceful, and full of
vivacity."' 6 Lady Betty appropriately chastises Lovelace and commiserates with Clarissa on her misfortunes. 5 7 From this evidence, Clarissa infers that the ladies are truly Lovelace's aunt and cousin. Yet
there is other evidence from which Clarissa could have inferred the
truth. The absence of arms on their coach could give rise to the inference that they were not members of Lovelace's family, but that inference is overborne by their explanation that the coach displaying the
family arms was being repaired.' 6 8 Clarissa "once saw this Lady Betty
• ..take out a paper from her stays and look into it, and put it there
again."'6 9 But she does not realize that the woman is consulting the
script Lovelace has provided her.
The problem with circumstantial evidence, as Alexander Welsh realizes, is that "[elach inference supposes a possible sequence of events,
but not necessarily the right one."' 60 It is obvious that Clarissa perceives the evidence that should demonstrate the true nature of Lovelace
and his schemes. Why, then, does she fail to discern the truth? One
explanation is psychological. Locke characterizes "Inference" as "the
great Act of the Rational Faculty ...when it is rightly made."' 61 But,
he warns, "the Mind,... very apt to favour the Sentiments it has once
imbibed, is very forward to make Inferences, and therefore often makes
too much hast[e]."' 6 2 Certainly, Clarissa's judgment about Lovelace is
distorted by her undeniable attraction to him. She wants to believe the
best of him; therefore, too hastily, she draws the inference that favors
him. For example, Clarissa misinterprets one of the few untainted
pieces of evidence with which she is presented. When Lovelace insists
on accompanying her to St. Paul's, Clarissa recounts, "[H]e opened the
street door, and taking my resisting hand led me, in a very obsequious
manner, to the coach. People passing by, stopped, stared, and whispered ... .""' The stares and whispers probably resulted from the
neighbors' astonishment at seeing a lady exiting a brothel on Sunday
and being handed into a coach by a gentleman. But Clarissa draws
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quite a different inference: "[Lovelace] is 1so64 graceful in his person and
dress, that he generally takes every eye."
This psychological explanation for her erroneous judgment does not
preempt an epistemological one. For Locke, the touchstone of Truth is
always Experience, and in discussing the degrees of assent, he refers to
the power of "common Experience. ' 165 Given the central role of experience in the Lockean reasoning process, Lovelace's exclamation, "She
has a world of knowledge ... but no experience!"' 66 takes on an ominous tone. For Richardson, as for other eighteenth-century moralists, a
woman's virtue existed in inverse proportion to her experience. But a
woman's lack of experience, while ensuring her virtue in one sense,
also jeopardized it when she. was confronted with a handsome rake.
Virtuous eighteenth-century women had no legitimate source of experience on which to draw in interpreting the evidence of their senses.
Clarissa discounts the evidence that Mrs. Sinclair and her house are
not what they seem because her lack of experience disables her from
inferring that respectable surroundings and genteel, well-bred, well16 7
read people could be associated with a brothel.
Both Lovelace and Clarissa herself attribute her blindness to her
lack of experience. As Lovelace puts it: "Silly little rogues! to walk out
into by-paths on the strength of their own judgements!-when nothing
but experience can teach them how to disappoint us, and learn them
grandmother-wisdom!"' 6 8 After discovering the imposture of Lady
Betty Lawrance and Miss Charlotte Montague, Clarissa acknowledges
to Anna her inability to imagine so thorough and dishonorable a deception: "She might oftener [have taken out a paper], and I not observe
it; for I little thought that there could be such impostors in the
world."' 69 Recounting "Lady Betty's" commiseration with her, she
asks rhetorically, "Could you have thought there was a woman in the
world who could thus express herself, and yet be vile?"' 7 Clarissa
admits, "Inexperience and presumption . . . have been my ruin!"''
But what type of experience could have protected Clarissa from her
own misinterpretations? Shortly before her death, analyzing her situa-

164. Id.
165. LOCKE, supra note 1, at 667.
166. RICHARDSON, supra note 2, at 789.
167. But see John Allen Stevenson, "Never in a Vile House": Knowledge and Experience
in Richardson, 34 LITERATURE & PSYCHOL. 4, 4 (1988) (arguing that Clarissa, while purportedly having no sexual experience, demonstrates "precocious knowledge" of sexual matters).
168. RICHARDSON, supra note 2, at 472.

169. Id. at 999.
170. Id.
171. Id. at 565.
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tion, Clarissa writes to Anna:
Oh, my dear, 'tis a sad, a very sad world!-While under our parents' protecting wings, we know nothing at all of it. Book-learned
and a scribbler, and looking at people as I saw them as visitors or
visiting, I thought I knew a great deal of it. Pitiable igno1
rance!-Alas! I knew nothing at all! 71
Clearly, Clarissa equates her book-learning and scribbling with the
"knowledge speculative"171 that Lovelace attributes to her, in contrast
to the "experience" she lacks. This state of inexperience, Clarissa suggests, is the world of conventional social relationships, in which parents protect'their daughters and others are encountered only "as visitors or visiting," when convention prescribes the range of permissible
interactions. Because she had seen people only when their behavior
was circumscribed by convention, she "knew nothing at all" of the
"sad, very sad world" that she has now entered. The "sad world" and
the world of "visitors and visiting" are contradistinguished. Thus, Clarissa suggests, social convention masks true human nature, which
emerges only when social convention has been eluded or, in Clarissa's
case, defied. As Clarissa discovers, the protections offered a young woman by social convention can be left behind, but the handicaps imposed by those conventions cannot. As Terry Castle puts it,
The battles of interpretation, in the text, in the world, are seldom
fair fights. In the case of Clarissa, it is true that Clarissa and Lovelace "collide and contend" in their efforts to affirm their "constructions" of experience and each other, but they are nowhere equal combatants in a political sense: Lovelace has available to him a kind of
"force" Clarissa does not-all the institutionalized advantages of patriarchal power, including the power of sexual intimidation17
If, as Clarissa suggests, experience involves the perception of human
nature unalloyed by social controls, the sexual realm provides the most
salient opportunity to gain that perception.
After her final escape from Mrs. Sinclair's, Clarissa discovers Lovelace's deceptions when she writes to Mrs. Norton, Lady Betty
Lawrance, and Mrs. Hodges to confirm the Singleton plot, the impersonation at Hampstead, and the identity of Tomlinson.1 75 She confronts Lovelace with the truth about the Hampstead episode:
I have been contemplating [the impostors'] behaviour, their conversation, their over-ready acquiescencies [sic] to my declarations in thy
172. Id. at 1194.
173. Id. at 789.
174. CASTLE, supra note 21, at 193.
175. RICHARDSON, supra note 2, at 978-86.
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disfavour; their free, yet affectedly reserved light manners: and now
that the sad event has opened my eyes, and I have compared facts
and passages together in the little interval that has been lent me, I
wonder I could not distinguish the behaviour of the unmatron-like jilt
whom thou broughtest to betray me, from the worthy lady whom
thou hast the honour to call thy aunt: and that I could not detect the
superficial creature whom thou passedst upon me for the virtuous

Miss Montague.

17 6

The eye-opening "sad event" that Clarissa refers to here could only be
the rape. In Warner's view, this catastrophic event "gives Clarissa this
advantage[:] Lovelace can no longer deceive her, for his final intentions
have been exposed. .

.

. For Clarissa, the rape has unalterably fixed

Lovelace's meaning-he simply is evil." 1 " More generally, Robert
Uphaus notes that Richardson "does not . . . protect his heroine from

'experience.' Rather he submits her to experience-dramatically represented by the rape-in order finally to celebrate her virtue."'1 8 The
rape of Clarissa represents not just a physical violation and a spiritual
subversion, but also a crisis of knowledge. 79 Only in losing her innocence does Clarissa gain epistemological competence. Her story suggests, therefore, that the "common Experience""' s that can serve as the
guarantor of correct judgment is the experience of human-or, perhaps, specifically male-depravity.
So depraved is Lovelace that he actually manufactures the evidence
that successfully deceives Clarissa. Arguably, because the evidence is
manufactured, it is not truly "circumstantial" evidence, which is characterized by "freedom from human deliberation at the origin."'' But

176. Id. at 902.
177. WARNER, supra note 21, at 72-73.
178. ROBERT W. UPHAUS, THE IMPOSSIBLE OBSERVER: REASON AND THE READER IN
18TH-CENTURY PROSE 79 (1979).
179. Warner also sees the rape as a crisis of knowledge for Lovelace: "The rape is also to
be a moment of knowing-the moment when Clarissa will be undressed, seen, penetrated, and
known." WARNER, supra note 21, at 50. Just as I am interested in Clarissa as the subject of her
own interpretations, not just the object of others', see supra note 21,,so I see Clarissa, in relation
to the rape, as the knower, not just the known. Indeed, the progress of her tragedy may be
marked by her progress from passivity to activity, see PATRICIA MEYER SPACKS, DESIRE AND
TRUTH: FUNCTIONS OF PLOT IN EIGHTEENTH-CENTURY ENGLISH NOVELS 63-66 (1990), and
by her development of a Lockean "self," see id. at 58 ("Once Lovelace has raped her, Clarissa,
whose early life has passed in loving relationship to others, retreats into preoccupation with
perfecting her self and her story."); see generally Susan H. Williams, Feminist Legal Epistemology, 8 BERKELEY WOMEN'S L.J. 63, 89 (1993) ("The subject, or knower, who emerges from
the Cartesian assumptions is clearly separated from the external world that is the object of
knowledge and possesses firm identity boundaries."). My insistence on Clarissa as an epistemological subject is congruent with my focus on her as a Lockean knower.
180. LOCKE, supra note 1, at 667.
181. WELSH, supra note 16, at 7.
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no one interpreting the circumstances can know for certain whether
they are authentic or not. The eighteenth-century proponents of circumstantial evidence answered this objection by asserting that "it is not
within the reach and compass of human abilities to invent a train of
circumstances which shall be so connected together as to amount to a
proof of guilt, without affording opportunities of contradicting a great
part, if not all of those circumstances." 1 82
The validity of circumstantial evidence thus depends on the deceiver's human limitations and the judger's ability and willingness to
interpret correctly the contradictory circumstances. However, in Clarissa's case, she is psychologically and epistemologically disabled from
making use of the contradictory evidence,18 while Lovelace, the "great
plotter," 184 uses his station, his wealth, and the social advantages of his
sex to manipulate the evidence in almost superhuman fashion.18 5 Only
spiritually and intellectually is Clarissa Lovelace's equal. Despite her
family's wealth, she is below Lovelace's rank socially; she'does not enjoy Lovelace's freedom of movement; by leaving with Lovelace, she violates social convention; and, as a minor femme sole, she cannot make
use of the wealth left to her by her grandfather.1 88 Clarissa's impeccable literacy and the textual equality she enjoys with Lovelace, as her
letters take their place alongside his in the novel, are misleading; represented by her letters, Clarissa appears more powerful than she is. As
Patricia Meyer Spacks has shown, Lovelace's frantic plot-making enacts his desire for power over Clarissa. 187 Just as "power relations define significant action in the world," 1 8 8 so do power relations define the
interpretation of evidence. When power relations are unequal, when
the plotter is superior to the judge in gender, social position, financial
resources, and freedom of movement, there is no guarantee that the
circumstances are authentic. In this sense, as Terry Eagleton notes,

182. Id. at 28 (quoting JOSEPH

GURNEY, THE TRIAL OF JOHN DONELLAN,

ESQ. FOR

THE WILFUL MURDER OF SIR THEODOSIus EDWARD ALLESLEY BOUGHTON. BART. AT THE

ASSIZE AT WARWICK, ON FRIDAY, MARCH 30TH 1781 (London, Kearsley .& Gurney 1781));

see also SHAPIRO, supra note 6, at 219.
183. In Pennington and Hastie's terms, perhaps, the nature of Clarissa's "world knowledge" prevents her from constructing a story in which she is deluded, abducted, imprisoned, and
raped by a gentleman. See generally Pennington & Hastie, supra note 15, at 521-23 (discussing
the three types of knowledge from which a juror constructs a story that is ultimately "accepted
by the juror as the best explanation of the evidence").
184. RICHARDSON, supra note 2, at 50.
185. See CASTLE, supra note 21, at 183 ("[Bleing party to traditional masculine prerogatives, [Lovelace] is free to exercise a set of social, economic, psychological, and sexual 'controuls'
over [Clarissa].").
186. See ZOMCHICK, supra note 21, at 65-66.
187. See SPACKS, supra note 179, at 63-66.
188. Id. at 59.
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"[Tiruth is always a matter of power and position.""'
The kind of carefully managed narrative celebrated by Welsh depends for its truth on the strong voice of the omniscient narrator. But
no such narrator exists in Clarissa's life. Clarissa's tragedy originates
in her move from the realm of authority to the realm of experience. As
Mrs. Howe puts it, "[S]ee what comes of disobedience to parents!" 9
Clarissa herself acknowledges her error in relying on perceptual rather
than preceptual sources of knowledge: "But depending on my own
strength; having no reason to apprehend danger from headstrong and
disgraceful impulses, I too little, perhaps, cast up my eyes to the Supreme Director: in whom, mistrusting myself, I ought to have placed
my whole confidence!"''
Entering into an evidentiary relationship with truth proves tragic for
Clarissa, who has no beneficent, omniscient manager to guide her interpretation of the evidence. Like the letters themselves,' 9" evidence inevitably marks an absence while attempting to bridge the gap between
the present and the past. In Clarissa's life, as in Gilbert's scheme, that
absence opens up an epistemological chasm into which human depravity can intrude."' The evidentiary realm, in which truth is a matter of
inference, is not governed by Providential design;" 4 instead, for Clarissa, the evidentiary realm is "a world in which evil is real and unconquerable, justice is guaranteed neither by human structures nor by
supernatural intervention, and meanings remain vexed and
obscure."195
The eighteenth-century law of evidence presupposed human depravity; until Clarissa gained experience of that depravity, she was unable
to interpret the evidence correctly. Because the type of experience assumed by Gilbertian evidentiary principles was not neutral and universally available to all knowers, it inscribed culturally determined
power relations within the eighteenth-century law of evidence. Thus,
Clarissa's story exposes what Gilbert's scheme obscures: the inade-

189. EAGLETON, supra note 21, at 79.
190. RICHARDSON, supra note 2, at 975; see KEYMER, supra note 2, at 126-28 (Clarissa's
parents represent authority).
191. RICHARDSON, supra note 2, at 565.
192. ALTMAN, supra note 79, at 43 ("As an instrument of communication between sender
and receiver, the letter straddles the gulf between presence and absence . . . ."); see also CASTLE, supra note 21, at 44 ("A letter is a text, and any text, Jacques Derrida claims, is .. .a
sign of absence.").
193. For an alternative metaphorical reading, see WARNER, supra note 21, at 50 (In raping Clarissa, Lovelace " 'lays bare' the text, 'sees' its significance, 'penetrates' to its real meaning, and thus 'knows' it.").
194. See KEYMER, supra note 2, at 207-10. See generally id. at 199-214.
195. Id. at 214.
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quacy of the Lockean model of cognitive self-sufficiency for knowers
who are innocent and powerless.
IV.

CONCLUSION

William Twining has complained:
The general tendency of Anglo-American Evidence scholarship is
not only optimistic, it is also remarkably unskeptical in respect of its
basic assumptions. Hardly a whisper of doubt about the possibility of
knowledge, about the validity of induction, or about human capacity
to reason darkens the pages of Gilbert or Bentham or Best or Thayer
or Wigmore or Cross or other, leading writers. Confident assertion,
pragmatic question-begging or straightforward ignoring are the characteristic responses to perennial questions raised by philosophical
skeptics.'9

In Twining's view, even approaches that display skepticism about the
judicial process are "directed at the design and the actual operation of
a particular system and the claims that are made for it, rather than at
the underlying philosophical assumptions and aspirations of the Rationalist Tradition."' 97 As we have seen, however, Clarissa provided
an eighteenth-century critique of the "underlying philosophical assumptions" inherent in Gilbert's scheme and expressed more than just
a "whisper of doubt" about the optimistic rationalism that Twining
attributes to Gilbert and his successors. Feminist critics of Western science and philosophy, like Evelyn Fox Keller, 98 Susan Bordo, 1" and
Lorraine Code, 00° have embarked upon a project of asking whether
socially constructed power relationships have been embodied in seemingly neutral scientific and philosophical systems.2 ' In the legal
sphere, the law of evidence purports to be such a neutral system. If we
take Clarissa's story seriously as a critique of eighteenth-century evi196. TWINING, supra note 7, at 75.
197. Id. at 76.
198. EVELYN Fox KELLER, REFLECTIONS
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(1985).
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AND

(1987).

200. LORRAINE CODE, WHAT CAN SHE KNOW? FEMINIST THEORY AND THE CONSTRUCTION OF KNOWLEDGE (1991).
201. See Martha Minow & Elizabeth V. Spelman, In Context, 63 S.CAL. L. REV. 1597,
1601 (1990) (examination of context can "expose how apparently neutral and universal rules in
effect burden or exclude anyone who does not share the characteristics of privileged, white,
Christian, able-bodied, heterosexual, adult men for whom those rules were actually written");
see also Baron, supra note 15, at 259 ("[S]tories are said to demonstrate something about how
power works, especially how it can inhere invisibly in the most apparently 'neutral' of standards."); Lucie E. White, Subordination, Rhetorical Survival Skills, and Sunday Shoes: Notes
on the Hearingof Mrs. G., 38 BUFF. L. REV. 1 (1990). See generally Williams, supra note.179.
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dence law, we may be required to undertake a similar critique of modern evidence rules, examining how they operate in the lives of those for
whom they were not written.

